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regression analysis to establish whether Egyptian  Asian, Mexican, Pakistani, and Turkish - to
cotton's  prices can be effectively hedged by  determine how they behave relative to U.S.
using existing futures contracts on the New York  medium staple cotton prices. None of these
Cotton Exchange.  prices had short-term movements closely related
to U.S. cotton prices, indicating mainly the
They find no relationship between the  influence of domestic policies on the U.S.
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long cottons and prices for the base quality of  contract does not provide a satisfactory hedge for
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York futures market. (Probably because Egyp-
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by nrice support policies unrelated to the longer  based on the Cotlook A Index - may prove
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- and probably not under market-determined  transparency to the price-forming process. When
prices.  the spot market is functioning well, establishing
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If the cotton market in Egypt is liberalized,  instrument for Egyptian cotton.
cotton prices there may correlate more with
prices elsewhere - especially for the longer
staple cottons.
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Introduction
This paper examines risk management  possibilities  for Egyptian cottons.  Risk management  is
important given that the volatility of export prices for Egyptian cotton is high.  The coefficient of
variation is between 18.6% and 23.4%, depending on the cotton variety, while the average for all
primary commodities  is between 17%  and 19%  .'  Three questions  arise with respect  to risk management:
first, can Egyptian  cottons be hedged using the existing  cotton contract in New York?  If the answer is
negative, can Egyptian cottons be hedged using a futures contract representing other cottons such as
Turkish, Pakistani or  Central Asian cottons?  Third, if  price movements of Egyptian cotton are
uncorrelated  with  prices of other cottons, what is the possibility  of establishing  a cotton  futures contract(s)
representing  Egyptian cotton varieties? The paper investigates  these questions.
The structure  of the paper is as follows:  the first section  describes  the market for Egyptian  cottons
and for other extra-fine  cottons. It also describes  the characteristics  and structure of the cotton market
in Egypt. The second  section  presents  an econometric  analysis  of the relationship  between  the movements
of the prices  of Egyptian  and other cottons. This section  offers answers  to the first two questions  above.
Section  three discusses  the results of the above  analysis  and assesses  the implications  for hedging  options.
Section  four deals with the feasibility  of establishing  a cotton  exchange  for spot and futures transactions.
It describes  the constraints  facing the establishment  of a successful  futures contract for Egyptian cotton,
as well as presenting  some ideas of how a spot market could operate.  Section  five concludes.
'The coefficient  of variation is measured as the standard  error of the regression of the price on its
time trend.2
1.  Characteristics  of the Egyptian Cctton Market
The Egyptian  cotton market operated actively  under free market conditions  prior to the socialist
revolution  in the early 1950s. During  the pre-revolution  period  an active  physical spot market for cotton
was in operation in Alexandria.  It was maintained  briefly in the post-revolution  period but became
inoperative due to heavy government interference.  During the pre-revolution  period, Egypt was the
world's principal  producer  and exporter of extra-long  and long staple  cotton. It accounted  for over 70%
of world production  and exports in these cottons.
In Egypt, cotton is typically  produced  on small owner-operated  farms.  Cotton  growing  has been
limited to 33% of total crop land and farmers have been required, by law, to plant a specified area to
cotton.  However, the cotton area has now declined to around 13.3% of the toWal  crop area. The
Government  determines  the area to be planted, the cotton crop rotation, and the variety which farmers
in a given locality may grow. It also buys seedcotton  from farmers at procurement  prices set annually.
Cotton procurement prices are proposed by the Ministry of Agriculture and approved by the Higher
Policy Committee  which represents  the main ministries.
The Egyptian Holding Company for Cotton, formerly the Egyptian Cotton Authority, in the
Ministry of Economy  and Foreign Trade controls  cotton marketing,  ginning, and exports. The Cotton
Authority exercises these functions through  supervision of six  export  companies, five ginning
companies, and a cotton press/baling  plant, all of which are public sector organizations.  After harvest,
farmers deliver their seedcotton  to village cooperative  collection  centers. Seedcotton  is transported  from
there to a nearby gin. Farmers are paid on the basis of lint classification  after deduction of ginning,
transportation,  and cooperative  costs.  Until recently, the price received by farmers was equivalent  to3
about  50% of the world price.  Under the recent economic  reforffiprogram,  'cotton producer  prices have
been raised to 66% of world prices.
Cotton lint is classified by the Cotton Arbitration and Testing Generai Organization  against
maintained  standards  according  to variety, grade, and type. The quality  classification  system  for Egyptian
cotton contains  as many as 16 grades, but currently the export pricing system includes prices for only
seven grades of the Giza 45 variety and for only the five top grades of all other varieties.
After ginning, cotton lint is allocated to export companies for sale to foreign buyers and to
government-ow ad spinning milis by the Ministry  of Economy and Foreign Trade, in consultation  with
the Textile  Industries  Corporation,  now also a holding  company,  and the Ministry  of Industry  and Mineral
Wealth. Allocations are based on the size of the crop, domestic mill requirements, cotton imports,
Egypt's need for foreign  exchange, and international  prices. Cotton  export  prices are set by the Ministry
of Economy  and Trade and the Cotton Authority,  based on an assessment  of world market conditions.
When prices are announced,  bids are invited from foreign buyers. Domestic spinning mills buy lint at
highly  subsidized  prices, which are usually  equivalent  to or lower than prices received  by farmers.
The Textile Industries Corporation (TIC), a public sector holding company, has a  virtual
monopoly  on cotton yarn production  and controls  around 90% of the weaving  industry. It has 30 large,
mostly vertically integrated  enterprises  under its direction. The installed capacity in the spinning mills
consists  of three million  ring spindles  (design capacity  of 3 million tons/year) and 25,000 rotors (design
capacity  of 40,000 tons/year). The TIC has a monopoly  on all cotton procurement  for domestic  use.4
Under the ongoing economic  reform  program, the Government  has undertaken  significant  steps
towards liberalizing  the cotton  sector. The basic  framework  of the reforms includes: (a) unification  of the
exchange rate at the commercial  rate; (b) gradually increasing input prices to reach economic levels
within a specified time period; (c) gradually lifting import bans and reducing the number of banned
commodities;  (d) revising the tariff code; (e) removal  of informal  trade restrictions;  and (f) assurance  that
public and private enterprises face the same incentives.
Egypt's cotton  production accounts  for only about 2% of the world total and its share of world
output of extra-fine  cottons (extra-long  and long staples) has declined to less than 30% during the last
three seasons. Due to the desirable qualities  of these  cottons  for manufacturing  high-value  products, they
command  premium prices in world markets relative  to other cottons. Moreover, prices for these cottons
appear to change in response  to supply and demand for these specific qualities  and to be little affected
by changes  in prices for medium staple cottons.
Egypt  has had a long tradition  of growing  and exporting  a major share (about  40%) of the world's
longest  and finest  cottons. Only  after the late 1970s  has extra-fine  cotton  produced  outside  the Nile River
Valley  challenged  Egyptian  cottons  in a major way (Tables 1 and 2). Peru has produced  extra-fine  cotton
for many years, but since 1970  output has fluctuated  widely, while only occasionally  exceeding  30,000
tons.  Historically,  India and the former Soviet  Union (FSU) were major importers  of extra-fine  cotton
but since 1986/87, having developed their own production capabilities, they are exporters of these
cottons. China  has increased its production  of extra-fine  cotton in recent years, from 15,000  tons in 1986
to 60,000 tons in 1990. Some of this cotton is offered  for export. Israel's production  of extra-fine  Pima
cotton fluctuates  in response to the availability  of irrigation water and the rt, ative prices of Pima and
upland cottons.  Its output is virtually all exported. The most important  competitors  for Egyptian  cottons
in export markets  have been Sudanese  Barakat (until recently)  and United States Pima (since 1989/90).
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Its characteristics  of fiber fineness  and strength make extra-fine  cotton desirable  for spinning  the
highest quality combed cotton yarns. Such yarns are used for producing fine apparel fabrics, laces,
embroidery  fabrics, knitted goods, household  fabrics, and strong industrial cloths. The unique qualities
of extra long staple  (ELS), and to a lesser extent long staple (LS) cottons,  limit the competition  faced by
Egyptian cottons to a few select extra-fine fiber cottons that account for a small proportion of world
cotton production  (5.3% to 7.5% in recent years).
Table 1:  PRODUCTION  OF EXTRA-FINE  COITON 1986  TO 1990
('000 Tons)
Country/Year  1986  1987  1988  |  1989  1990
China  15.0  25.2  25.0  35.1  60.0
Israel  16.0  12.5  18.5  31.2  15.5
Peru  28.1  10.7  23.0  32.6  26.8
Sudan  73.1  42.4  40.5  49.1  14.2
United States  44.8  62.0  72.8  150.7  78.9
India  254.6  217.6  191.2  213.1  194.0
FSU  313.0  371.0  390.1  264.0  318.0
Others  10.1  12.8  10.8  11.0  14.1
Egypt, ELS  109.3  82.5  80.6  80.8  82.7
Egypt, LS  288.3  265.2  226.2  204.2  209.3
World Total  1152.3  1101.9  1078.7  1071.6  1012.8
Extra-Fine's Share  7.5  6.2  5.9  6.2  5.3
of World Cotton (%)
Egypt's Share of
Extra-Fine Prod. (%)  34.5  31.6  28.4  26.6  28.8
Source: Cotton  World Statistics,  ICAC, April 19926
Synthetic  fiber yarns are sutitable  for"some  extra-fine  cotton uses and have made serious inroads
into former all-cotton  products. 2 The extremely high prices for extra-fine  cotton during recent seasons
and competition  from sy-.thetics,  in thread and fabric manufacturing  have reduced import demand for
cotton.  Therefore, world exports have declined from their rather stable level of 373-387,000  tons per
year during the period from the early 1960s  to the mid 1970s  to an average of 275,000 tons during the
1987-90  period (Table 2).  Moreover, in recent seasons, a substantial shift has occurred in the export
supply of extra-fine cotton. The declining exports of Egypt and Sudan have been replaced by other
producers, particularly  the United  States. Egypt's export supply  of extra-fine  cotton  has diminished  due
to declining  production and domestic  mills taking an increasing  share of output.
Since the extra-fine cottons are,  in  a  sense,  a  specia' y  fiber,  they are  employed in
manufacturing in  a  specialized sector of  the general textile industry and  many countries do  not
manufacture  these cottons. The number  of countries  that import  these cottons  in significant  quantities  is
even more limited because several consuming countries fill their own  needs-such  as India, the
Commonwealth  of Independent  States, and the United  States.  The major importers of fine cottons  are
Western  Europe and Japan.
2Even  in extra-fine  cotton's largest  end-use-sewing thread-synthetic monofilament  is used as a core
of the thread to add strength. The synthetic's weakness  in this use of a low melting  point is overcome
by wrapping  the thread's synthetic  core with cotton  yarn to protect the synthetic  component  from the high
temperature  generated  in high-speed  industrial  sewing operations.7
Table 2: WORLD EXTRA-FINE  COTTON  EXPORTS  BY ORIGIN 1987/88  TO 1990/91
('000 Tons)
Country  1988/87  1988/89  1989/90  1990/91
Egypt  87.7  60.0  43.0  18.0
United States  51.6  57.7  98.4  90.4
Sudan  63.1  52.5  32.9  27.7
FSU  47.5  56.5  31.6  7.8
India  NA.  NA.  25.5  3.6
Israel  12.5  18.0  30.5  14.2
China  21.8  13.0  8.2  10.0
Peru  2.5  11.1  10.1  20.7
Others  11.3  13.8  7.5  11.7
Total  298.2  282.6  287.6  204.0
Notes: Egyptian  exports are for ELS and LS cotton combined.
The cotton season begins August 1 of the year designated.
NA indicates  data is not available.
Source: Cotton  World Statistics, ICAC, April 1992.8
II.  Relationships  Between  Cotton Pricas
We employed  regression  analysis  to establish  whether  fluctuations  in Egyptiar.  cotton  prices (ELS
and LS) can be hedged using the New York cotton futures market.  With the regression analysis  we
sought to establish  whether the price changes in Egyptian cotton could be explained  by changes  in US
cotton prices.  We regressed the logarithmic difference  of each of the Egyptian cotton prices on the
logarithmic  difference  of the US cotton price.  We used the logarithmic difference  because these price
series are non-stationary. 3 For hedging  purposes,  the differences  in the price levels do not matter; what
matters is whether  price movements  in the Egyptian  and US cottons are closely related. The US cotton
price analyzed  is for grade 41, staple 34 (medium  staple) cotton. We chose this quality because it is the
base quality for the New York No. 2 cotton contract and, thus, the New York cotton futures' price has
to follow this spot price closely.  If prices for other cottons  move closely with the US cotton  price, the
New York cotton futures contract can be used for hedging  the price risk of these other cottons.
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 3a.  No relationship  was found
between the Egyptian ELS and LS cotton price movements  and movements of the US medium staple
cotton price.  The R-squares  are zero and the coefficients  are statistically  insignificant. Therefore, the
N.Y. cotton futures market's No. 2 contract  is an inappropriate  mechanism  for hedging  the price risk of
Egyptian  cotton. There are two plausible  explanations  for the lack of a significant  relationship  between
the prices of these cottons.  First, Egyptian cotton prices are determined  by government  policies and,
thus, their movements  are unrelated  to cotton  prices  determined  in the US market.'  Second, the technical
3Non-stationarity  implies that regressions in levels (or log levels) may be of a spurious nature
(Phillips, 1986). This implies that neither the parameter estimates  nor their standard errors should  be
tested.  To avoid this problem, regressions  should employ  differenced  or log-differenced  non-stationary
data.
4See Monke (1981).9
characteristics  of Egyptian ELS and LS cottons are greatly different from those of US medium staple
cotton, and they do not substitute  for each other in the manufacture  of cotton textiles. Therefore, their
prices are formed under different supply/demand  conditions.
Similar  regression analysis  was performed  on the movements  of prices of American  Pima cotton
and the prices of US medium staple cotton.  Since American Pima cotton is substitutable  for some
qualities  of Egyptian cottons  and its export price is determined  in the international  market, a significant
relationship  between the prices for American Pima and US medium staple cotton would hold some
promise for hedging Egyptian cotton on the N.Y. futures market once the Egyptian cotton market is
privatized and the impact of  government intervention on the prices of Egyptian cottons is absent.
However, the regression analysis (Table 3a) does not reveal any relationship  between Pima and US
medium  staple  cotton price movements. This result indicates  that the present  contract  at the N.Y. futures
market is not appropriate  for hedging Pima cotton, nor would it be useful for hedging Egyptian cotton
price risk in a liberalized  market.
If price movements  are not close from month  to month, are there market forces that at least pull
them  together in the long run? This question  can be analyzed  using tests for cointegration. Cointegration
examines  whether  there exists a long-run stationary relationship  between two or more variables.  It can
also be considered  as a test for market integration. That is, in Section I we saw that Egyptian cottons
have different characteristics  than other, medium  staple, cottons. The question  is, are these differences
enough  to imply  market segmentation  in cotton? The results of the tests for cointegration  between  prices
of Egyptian  cottons,  pima cotton, and US medium  staple cotton  are shown in Table 4.  These tests reject
the hypothesis  of a long-run relationship  between the two Egyptian prices and the US medium staple
cotton price.  However, such a relationship  between  Pima and US medium staple cotton prices cannot10
be rejected, at least at a 90% level of significance. Hence, over the long run Pima and US cotton prices
tend to move  together. It appears  that market forces, such as substitutability  in production, tends to pull
these prices together in the long run (between  seasons), even if their prices diverge in the short run
(within seasons).  Such a relationship  does not hold between Egyptian cotton prices and US medium
staple cotton prices.  It is important  to note that for hedging  purposes, the month-to-month  relationship
matters.  Cointegration  tests are used to see whether there is a broader, long-run relationship  between
prices. These latter tests give an indication  of the extent of integration  of the world cotton market.
We extended  the regression  analysis  to see how other cotton  prices benave  vis-a-vis the US cotton
price.  We chose medium staple cottons of comparable  quality from Pakistan, Turkey, Central Asia 5,
Australia  and Mexico. The results showed  that none of the five prices investigated  moves closely with
the US grade 41, staple 34 cotton price, indicating  the influence  of domestic policies and US weather
conditions on the US market.'  All R-squares are quite low.  Hence, the New York futures contract
provides  an unsatisfactory  hedge  for all of these cottons. The strongest  short-run  price relationships  were
found between the Central Asian, Mexican, Pakistani, Australian and Turkish cottons.  However, the
cointegration  tests performed  indicated  the existence  of long-run  relationships  between  each  of these  prices
and the US cotton price (although  it was not as strong for the Australian  cotton as for the others). 7 In
summary, the cointegration  test results show that all cotton prices, except the Egyptian, tend to move
together in the long-run.
5Until  recently, the Cotton  Outlook called  this cotton "Russian".
MThe  impact  of the US Government  intervention  is somewhat  predictable  by market participants.  The
US Government  affects the market mainly  through subsidies  to reduce export and domestic  prices when
they exceed  a certain  level, limits on acreage  and the loan  programs, while  all these instruments  can make
US prices diverge from other cotton prices in the European  market, they do not impede the functioning
of a futures contract. Although, they may limit the use of cotton futures contracts.
'Note that transitivity holds in cointegration. If X is cointegrated  with Y and Y with Z, then X is
cointegrated  with Z.11
The analysis  described  above  suggests  thattthe  New York cotton  futures7can  be used  to hedge  only
the medium staple  US cotton  varieties. This can explain  why the New York cotton  futures market is used
primarily by US traders, textile mills, and cotton growers, and less frequently by foreign interests. In
other commodities,  such as coffee,  cocoa  and crude  oil, futures contract  in New York are commonly  used
by foreign  producers and consumers.
The recent introduction  of a cotton futures contract in New York based on the Cotton Outlook
"A" Index may prove to provide  an acceptable  hedge for a number  of cottons. We employed  the same
regression analysis  as before to explore this issue.  Table 3b shows that the Cotton Outlook "A" Index
(CLAI) can  provide an adequate  hedge for the Pakistani,  Austialian and Central Asian  cottons, but is less
suitable for the Mexican and particularly  the Turkish cottons. As is the case with other cottons, CLAI
is poorly correlated with either the ELS or the LS Egyptian cotton prices.  Furthermore, it was found
to be poorly correlated with Pima cotton prices. The CLAI movements  are also not closely related the
movements  in US grade 41, staple  34 spot prices. So the introductionof  the CLAI  cotton  futures contract
does not appear to be suitable for hedging  the long fine cottons such as Egyptian and Pima varieties.
Finally, we tested the relationship  between  Egyptian cottons and the Turkish and Central Asian
cottons. If a relationship  exists, the establishment  of a regional futures contract could be to the mutual
benefit of the cotton sectors in these countries. However, the regression analysis  indicates  that there is
no short-run (month-to-month)  relationship  between  these prices. Nor does the cointegration  tests show
that there is a iong-run relationship.12
Another way to look at the relationship  between  prices is to comput. the correlation  coefficients
(CC) between  pairs of prices. 8 However, because  the price levels  are non-stationary  it is not appropriate
to compute the CCs on their levels, rather it should be done on their percent differences.  Table 5
presents the computed  CCs for the period 1985  to 1991,  using monthly  data. 9 The CCs that were found
highly statistically  significant are those between the Central Asian, Turkish, Australian, Mexican and
Pakistani  cottons. The US cotton (spot)  relationship  with the Australian,  Pakistani,  Mexican  and Central
Asian  cottons  was also significant. The weakest  relationship  was found  between  the Egyptian  cottons  and
Pima with every other cotton price in our sample. The relationship  between  the two Egyptian cottons,
ELS and LS, is significant. These  results are consistent  with those obtained  from the regression  analysis.
%Regression  analysis  looks at the same  short-run  relationship  as the CC. Cointegration  tests investigate
long-run relationships.
9The statistical significance of  the CC  is computed by multiplying the CC by the number of
observations. The computed  statistic  is distributed  at X 2 (1). In our case, each CC should be multiplied
by 72 and the critical value of the XI (1) is 3.84 at the 95% level of significance.13
III.  Expilanation  of the Statistical  Results
The independent  movement  of prices for US medium  staple  and Egyptian  extra-long  staple  cottons
is as expected.  Those two types of cotton are not substitutable  in their primary uses. Moreover, the price
of each is influenced  by independent  domestic cotton policies that address different market situations.
Monthly price movements  are also affected  by dissimilar seasonal marketing  patterns. During several
recent seasons, the export supply of Egyptian ELS cotton was quite limited and its sales were typically
allocated to traditional  users at prices determined  by the Egyptian Government. The marketing  season
was short--often  no more than one or two months--and  prices during the remainder  of the season were
of no informational  value, being set at levels near those at which  earlier sales took place. By contrast,
price movements  of US medium  staple cotton appeared  to be the result of changes  in supply  and demand
in the domestic and export markets during the entire year.  The Egyptian ELS and LS cotton prices
moved  together  mainly because  the Government  of Egypt  tended to set a fixed differential  between  them
each season.
The weakness  of the relationship  between prices for US Pima cotton and US medium staple
cotton basically  reflects their lack of substitutability  in manufacturing  uses.  The area planted to Pima
cotton does appear to be largely determined by the relative prices of Pima and medium staple cotton.
However, this is an annual  decision  and has only a limited  influence  on monthly  price movements  within
a season. Therefore, the number  2 contract  on the New York Cotton  Futures Market, based on medium
staple US cotton, is not a satisfactory  price hedging  mechanism  for either US Pima or for other cottons
that compete  with US Pima in international  markets.14
The divergence  of monthly cotton export price movements  for four medium staple cottons from
major exporting countries  relative to US domestic medium staple cotton prices are related to divergent
domestic  cotton  policies. The US market for raw cotton is largely insulated from foreign supplies  due to
import restraints which are relaxed only in periods of very tight supply. Cotton exports from Pakistan,
Turkey, and Central Asia were closely controlled  during the early parts of the seasdns being analyzed
to assure supplies to domestic  mills. Various  governmental  agencies  implemented  quotas or variable tax
rates on cotton for export.
The regression  results indicated  a relatively  strong  relationship  between  the short-term  movements
of export prices of medium staple cottons from Australia, Central Asia, Mexico, Pakistan, and Turkey.
This is an expected  result since these prices represent the offer rates of cottons  of similar quality in the
world's largest importing region--Western  Europe-under very competitive conditions. An important
implication  of this result is the possibility  of operating a successful  regional cotton futures market for
hedging  purposes. The necessary  volume  for such a market could potentially  be provided  by production
in Central Asia, Pakistan and Turkey.
Despite the low correlation  between the short-run price movements  of US and other cottons, a
strong long-run relationship  exists due to their close substitutability  in the manufacture  of cotton textile
products and  the competitiveness of  cotton transactions in  import markets. The slightly weaker
relationship  between  the monthly  price movements  for US and Australian  medium  staple cottons  over the
long-run  could  be related to the differing  seasonal  patterns  for marketing  crops grown in the northern  and
southern hemispheres.15
Table 3a:  REGRESSION  RESULTS'°
Variables  Coeff.  t-stat  R2 D.W.  SER
PERIOD 1983  M9 - 1991 M7
ELS, SPOT  -0.00  -0.07  0.00  1.98  0.04
ELS, PIMA  0.06  0.91  0.01  2.02  0.04
LS, SPOT  -0.00  -0.02  0.00  1.14  0.04
LS, PIMA  0.07  1.05  0.01  1.99  0.04
PIMA, SPOT  -0.01  -0.28  0.00  1.56  0.04
ELS, LS  0.88  21.40  0.83  1.94  0.02
PERIOD 1981  M9 - 1991  M7
PAK, SPOT  0.25  4.77  0.16  1.2U  0.06
IZMIR, SPOT  0.12  2.12  0.04  1.49  0.06
MEX, SPOT*  0.16  2.81  0.13  1.65  0.06
AUS, SPOT  0.15  2.91  0.10  1.22  0.05
RUS, SPOT*  0.18  3.08  0.13  1.03  0.06
LS, IZMIR  0.09  1.44  0.02  1.93  0.04
ELS, IZMIR  0.09  1.45  0.02  1.94  0.04
ELS, RUS*  -0.02  -0.23  0.00  2.03  0.04
LS, RUS*  -0.02  -0.23  0.00  1.99  0.04
PAK, IZMIR  0.53  6.45  0.26  1.37  0.05
RUS, IZMIR*  0.43  4.05  0.21  1.17  0.06
RUS, PAK*  0.78  14.05  0.75  1.77  0.03
AUS, PAK  0.68  12.74  0.73  2.18  0.03
AUS, IZMIR  0.39  4.06  0.21  1.34  0.05
AUS, RUS*  0.81  14.21  0.77  1.77  0.03
MEX, AUS*  0.68  8.89  0.53  1.82  0.04
Notes: ELS refers to Egypt's Menoufi/Giza  70 extra long staple  cotton; LS refers to Egypt's Dendera/Giza  69/81
long staple cotton; SPOT refers to United  States grade 41 staple 34 cotton  which is the representative  price in the
New York exchange; PIMA refers to American  pima G3 1-7/16" extra long staple cotton; PAK refers to the
Pakistani  Sing/Punjab  cotton; IZMIR refers to the Turkish Izmir ST 1 white 1-3/22  RG cotton; MEX refers to the
Mexican  middling  1-3/32  staple  cotton, and AUS  refers to the Australian  middling  staple 1-3/32"  cotton;  RUS refers
to Central Asian (formerly referred to as Russian)  Vtoroi, medium staple  cotton.  All prices are in US cents per
pound, CIF North Europe.
*  Regressions  with Central Asian  and Mexican  cottons were for the period 1985 M9 to 1991 M7.
'the regression is of the form Y, = a.  + a,  X, + u,, where Y, is the log difference  of the first
variable  in the column  of variables, X is the log difference  of the second  variable, a., a,, are coefficients
and u, is the error term.  The column coefficient  refers to the value of a, and the next column, t-stat,
refers to t-statistic  for a,.  D.W. stands for the Durbin-Watson  statistic  for serial correlation  and SER is
the standard  error  of the regression.16
Table 3b:  REGRESSION  RESULTS  FOR COTLOOK  - A INDEX AND OTHER COTTON
PRICES  PERIOD 1981M9  - 1991M7
Coeff.  t-Stat  R2  D.W.
ELS  A INDEX  0.06  0.81  0.01  1.97
LS  A INDEX  0.06  0.74  0.01  1.94
IZMIR  A INDEX  0.60  6.25  0.25  1.76
PAK  A INDEX  1.07  18.50  0.75  2.02
RUS  A INDEX  1.00  19.27  0.84  1.48
ARTS  A INDEX  0.86  14.05  0.74  2.07
MEX  A INDEX  0.63  7.74  0.46  2.05
SPOT  A INDEX  0.86  5.20  0.19  2.23
PIMA  A INDEX  0.02  0.21  0.01  1.56
See notes at the bottom  of Table 3.
Table 4:  COINTEGRATION  TEST RESULTS
Variables  DF  ADF
ELS, SPOT  -1.23  -1.02
ELS, PIMA  -0.99  -1.10
PIMA, SPOT  -1.57  -2.75*
LS, SPOT  -0.31  -0.27
PAK, SPOT  -3.20**  -3.00*
IZMIR, SPOT  -3.51**  -3.21**
PAK, IZMIR  -4.19**  4.68**
RUS, SPOT  -3.00**  -2.94*
AUS, SPOT  -2.86*  -2.71*
MEX, SPOT  -2.74*  -3.56**
ELS, IZMIR  -1.17  -1.28
LS, IZMIR  -0.40  -0.44
Significant  at the 90% level.
#*  Significant  at the 95% level.17
Table 5:  CORRELATION  MATRIX OF COTTON  PRICE MOVEMENTS
dLELS  dLLS  dLPIM  dLSPOT
dLELS  1.000  0.950  0.086  -0.014
dLLS  0.950  1.000  0.081  -0.007
dLPIM  0.086  0.081  1.000  -0.038
dLSPOT  -0.014  -0.007  -0.038  1.000
dLPAK  -0.061  -0.040  -0.120  0.401
dLIZM  0.017  0.035  -0.055  0.180
dLRUS  -0.027  40.028  -0.079  0.354
dLAUS  -0.073  -0.062  0.017  0.320
dLMEX  -0.003  -0.006  -0.122  0.339
dLAOUT  -0.018  -0.012  -0.079  0.404
dLPAK  dLIZM  dLRUS  dLAUS
dLELS  -0.061  0.017  -0.027  -0.073
dLLS  -0.040  0.035  -0.028  -0.062
dLPIM  -0.120  -0.055  -0.079  0.017
dLSPOT  0.401  0.180  0.354  0.320
dLPAK  1.000  0.539  0.864  0.844
dLIZM  0.539  1.000  0.446  0.459
dLRUS  0.864  0.446  1.000  0.854
dLAUS  0.844  0.459  0.854  1.000
dLMEX  0.777  0.545  0.716  0.730
dLAOUT  0.892  0.500  0.918  0.860
dLMEX  dLAOUT
dLELS  -0.002  -0.018
dLLS  -0.005  -0.012
dLPIM  -0.122  -0.079
dLSPOT  0.339  0.404
dLPAK  0.777  0.892
dLIZM  0.545  0.500
dLRUS  0.716  0.918
dLAUS  0.730  0.860
dLMEX  1.000  0.681
dLAOUT  0.681  1.000
NOTES: The prefix dL signifies logarithmic  difference. ELS and LS are the two Egyptian  cottons. PIM is the
US pima cotton, SPOT is the US 41,34 medium  staple cotton, PAK is the Pakistani  cotton, IZM is the Turkish,
RUS is the Central Asian (formerly  Russian",  AUS is the Australian,  MEX is the Mexican  and AOUT  the Outlook
A index. For a precise description  of each of the series see the notes of Table 3a.
Correlation coefficients higher than 0.07,  in absolute terms, are statistically significant at  the 95% level of
significance.18
V.  Issues in Establishing  an Egyptian  Coton Exchange
Given the weak relationship  between  the short-run price movements  of the Egyptian (ELS, LS)
cottons and the US cottons, Egyptian cottons cannot be hedged using the New York cotton futures
market.  Thus, the question  arises whether there is room for the creation  of an Egyptian cotton futures
exchange? The Government  of Egypt (GOE) is currently considering  re-opening  the Cotton Exchange
in Alexandria  which was closed in the early 1950s. This would be part of a program to liberalize  and
privatize  the cotton industry. GOE  has plans for the Cotton Exchange  to offer services  in futures as well
as in spot market transactions.
The main benefit to Egypt of establishing  such an exchange is that it would determine  prices for
Egypt's high quality cotton in a transparent and competitive  manner.  At present, prices for Egypt's
cotton are set by the Ministry of Economy  and Trade and the Cotton Authority  based on an assessment
of factors including world market conditions,  the size of the crop, domestic mill requirements,  cotton
imports, and Egypt's need for foreign  exchange. Egypt's cotton  export prices have been set at very high
levels  in recent years and, although  short-term  demand  is inelastic,  the high prices helped to dramatically
reduce export volumes.
For a futures market to operate effectively,  there are a number of conditions  that must be met.  "
Probably the five most important  are: (a) a well established  physical  market;1 2 (b) clear and appropriate
trading rules and the establishment  of a well-functioning  clearing house; (c) freedom from government
intervention; (d) adequate liquidity, i.e.,  large numbers of users and high volumes; (e) confidence  in
"For a general and extensive  discussion  on these conditions  see Leuthold (1992).
'2A  well  established physical market  is  one  where  prices  are  transparent and  determined
competitively.19
standardized  grading; and (f) support of the commodity  business community. Because  of difficulties  in
satisfying  these conditions, futures markets in various commodities  have failed.
The basic functions  of a futures exchange  is to develop, publish and enforce the rules of trading.
The rules of trading and their enforcement  aim at making the system trustworthy and thus encouraging
the participation  of traders.  1
3 Any systematic  attempt  to influence  prices via controls  on the sector will
damage the trust traders place in the functioning  of the futures market.  An example  is the intervention
of the US Government  in commodity  exchanges  during the 1960s. Through price support and stocking
policies, the US Government  controlled  US cotton prices and the traders' interest in the cotton futures
market diminished,  to the point where the New York cotton futures contract did not have the needed
liquidity  and became  almost ineffective.
The issue of liquidity  is very important. Liquidity  assures  buyers and sellers of futures contracts
that when  they wish to enter the market there will always be someone  willing to sell to them  or buy from
them.  Note that for a futures market to be successful, it has to attract not only physical  traders, as in
the case of a spot market, but also speculators.  The latter contribute significantly  to liquidity.  It is
illustrative,  therefore, to look at figures for the New York cotton futures contract. In late April 1992,
cotton futures contracts extended to March 1993. The total open interest outstanding  on one day was
about 34,000 contracts, equivalent to 770,000 tons of cotton.  The daily volume of transactions  was
roughly 7,000 contracts or  159,000 tons.  Annual US production of cotton is about 3.5 million tons.
Roughly  then, the open interest amounted  to 22% of annual production  and the daily trading volume to
4.5% of annual production. In Egypt's case, if only the cotton that is exported is traded on the futures
'3The  clearing  house has as its main function,  the maintenance  of guaranty  deposits, the maintenance
of the original and variation margins, the recording and posting of transactions and also handling of
physical  deliveries.20
exchange, roughly 50-55,000 tons annually, it is very doubtful  that there would be sufficient liquidity.
If the numbers for the United States applied to Egypt, only  1.5 to 2.5 thousand tons would be traded.
If, however, all cotton produced is included, then daily trades would increase to 14-15 thousand tons.
Again it is doubtful  whether this volume is large enough  to support a futures market.
The issue of liquidity should also be examined  in conjunction  with the varieties and grades of
Egyptian cotton.  Egyptian cotton is very well classified.  The exported ELS cotton consists of four
varieties, each of which has five grades (Giza 45 has seven grades).  The exported LS consist of two
varieties with five grades each.  In terms of magnitudes,  ELS production was about 83,000 toils and
exports 27,000 tons in 1990. The figures for LS are 209,000 tons produced and 7.000 tons exported
during 1990.  Usually, the futures contract is based on a specific  grade within a variety with discounts
and premiums  applied to the qualities  delivered above and below the average. If two contracts were to
be introduced, one based on the average variety and grade for ELS and the other on the LS, liquidity
could be an even  greater problem.  However, given the results in Table 7, ELS and LS prices move
closely  together with a basis risk of about 17%, which is within  an acceptable  range. So for the sake of
liquidity,  one contract  based on the most prominently  traded  variety and grade of the ELS could  represent
both the ELS and LS varieties and deliverable  grades, with, of course, the appropriate  discounts and
premium."  Still, liquidity could be a significant  constraint--particularly  if only exports are included.
However, it would  also be an important  constraint  even  if the whole cotton  production  (ELS and LS) was
represented  by this contract.
'4Basis  risk signifies  the difference  in the movements  between  two prices.  According  to commodity
brokers in New York, an acceptable  basis risk is below 20%.21
Since  the futures market is considerably  more complicated  for traders than the present syst..m and
it is questionable  whether there would be sufficient volume necessary for the effective operation of a
futures market in Egypt, the Cotton  Exchange  should  start with only a spot market. There are two types
of spot markets  that could  be considered  for Egypt's cotton; a physical  auction market and an electronic
tender market.  A physical auction market is one where commodities  are brought to the market and
auctioned  off.  Examples  of this are the tea auction markets in Calcutta, Chittagong, and Mombasa  and
the coffee auction market in Nairobi. At present, there are no physical auction markets for cotton.
One of the main reasons for the non-existence  of physical  auction markets for cotton is that the
same commodity  trading can be accomplished  much more efficiently  by a tender system using telex, fax
or other electronic  means  of communication.  An important  advantage  of the tender system is that neither
the commodity  (samples,  in the case of cotton)  nor the people involved  in the trade have to be physically
at the same place where the sale occurs.  Egypt and many other countries utilize tenders to purchase
cotton for import.  Tanzania's cotton is tendered using modern communication  facilities.  Tanzania's
Cotton  Board sends messages  to potential  buyers providing  detailed information  about the cotton to be
sold.  Bid openings and sales awards are public events.  Unannounced  reserve prices are utilized to
prevent sales at prices regarded  as unacceptably  low. More efficient  versions  of the auction  process have
been used since 1975  for marketing cotton produced in the US Southwest region (Texas plains and
Oklahoma)  through an electronic  communication  network  managed  by Telcot. Continued  innovations  in
communications  have enabled improvements  in local coverage  and the range of services provided.
It would be feasible for Egyptian cotton to be traded by tender within an anticipated  private
marketing  system. Cotton's durability,  storability  and established  system for quality determination  make
it possible to trade cotton without the physical presence of buyers at the trading site.  However, theconfirmation  of the quality  of the delivered  product  must be reinforced  by trading  rules that permit
arbitration  of ouality  diasputes  by agreed  experts.
For a cotton  tender  trading  system  to operate  efficiently  and intemnationally  in Egypt,  GOE  and
the cotton  industry  would  have  to make  several  changes,  including:
(a)  Introduce  market  incentives  for the operation  of parastatals  and permit  the involvement
of private  sector  companies  in both exporting  and domestic  trading. The privatization
of the six exporting  parastatals  while  desirable  is not essential  for the tender  trading
system  to operate. More important  is the introduction  of market  incentive-s  into the
cotton  trading  system.
(b)  Sell  through  the system  for domestic  demand  as well as for export. The benefit  would
be the increased  volume,  the transparency  of price discovery,  and the integration  of
domestic  and export  prices.
(c)  If imposed,  make export  taxes  explicit,  instead  of setting  fixed  prices with  the tax (or
subsidy)  being  the residual. This, again,  is necessary  to render  the system  transparent
for everyone  involved.
Such  a trading  system  could  be operated  by an independent,  private  body  or by a cotton  exporters'
association  once  the cotton  trade  has been  liberalized.23
After a physical spot market for cotton has been established and has earned the trust of the
business  community,  a next step could be the establishment  of a forward market.5 A forward market
functions  like a spot market, i.e., using the proposed auction  form, with the only difference  being that
the physical  delivery of cotton will be sometime  in the future.  The establishment  of a forward market
could  provide a useful instrument for hedging  Egyptian cottons.
'5A forward market can function as a futures market in terms of hedging.  Producers, by selling
forward can 'lock" a price, the same way as if they sold futures.  The two notable differences  between
futures and forward markets are: first, forward markets usually require physical delivery.  Second,
forward markets do not require daily margins (marked-to-market),  thus the performance risk can be
significant.24
VI.  Conclusions
This paper has shown that short-term  movements  in Egyptian  cotton prices, extra-long staple  and
long staple, are not correlated with movements  of cotton prices in the New York futures market.
Therefore, Egyptian  cottons  cannot  be hedged  using tiie New York cotton futures contract. Similar tests
on American  Pima  prices (an extra-long  staple  cotton  that substitutes  for some Egyptian  cottons)  and US
medium staple cotton prices showed  no relationship  between  their price movements. It was also found
that no relationship  exists between movements in Egyptian cotton prices and prices of cottons from
Turkey, Pakistan,  Central Asia, Mexico,  and Australia. This led  us to formulate  two explanations. First,
Egyptian  cottons  possess  sufficiently  different  characteristics  from medium-staple  cottons  such as the ones
tested that their price movements  are not correlated. Second, the prices of Egyptian cottons  have been
so heavily influenced  by governmental  intervention  that their movements were divorced from market
fundamentals. The government's  recent reform  program  may increase  the correlation  between  Egyptian
and other cotton prices to some extent.  This may be more the case for the LS Egyptian cotton than the
ELS cotton, given that the LS cotton  has more substitutes  in the international  market.
When  examining  the correlations  between  cotton  price movements,  we found that  price movements
between  medium-staple  cottons  from various  origins were correlated  among  themselves  but not with  price
movements  in the New York No. 2 cotton futures contract.  In effect, therefore, none of the other
medium-staple  cottons tested can be hedged  using the New York cotton futures contract. However, the
medium-staple  cotton prices were correlated with the Cotton Outlook "A"  index.  So, the recent
introduction  of a New York futures contract based on the Cotton Outlook "A"  index may provide
medium-staple  cottons with a useful hedging  instrument--but  not the Egyptian cottons. Egyptian cotton
price movements  were not correlated  with movements  in the Cotton Outlook "A" Index.25
In examining  whether a futures exchange  can be established  in Egypt for Egyptian cottons, the
study found the following  obstacles: (a) lack of a well-estab!ished  physical market; (b) the existence  of
heavy government  intervention  in domestic  commercialization  and exports;  and (c) in all likelihood,  lack
of adequate  liquidity  for establishment  of a futures contract. For these reasons it may not be wise to try
to establish  a futures contract  for Egyptian cotton.  Rather, it is recommended  that Egypt should try to
establish  a spot market in order to bring transparency to price-setting. A necessary  condition for such
a market to function soundly is for the private sector to play a significant  role.  If a spot market is
,-stablished,  after some time the next step can be to set up a forward market that could  provide a hedging
instrument  for Egyptian  cottons.26
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